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WHEN IS AN ATTORNEY UNREASONABLE AND
VEXATIOUS?
When an attorney exceeds the bounds of the law or unduly burdens
the court system, courts may sanction the offending attorney.' In sanctioning
the offending attorney, courts can remove some of the abuses in the litigation
system and, consequently, promote judicial efficiency in resolving disputes. 2
1. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980). The Supreme Court in
Roadway Express recognized the inherent power of courts to sanction attorneys who litigate
in bad faith or abuse the litigation system. Id. Before Roadway Express the United States
Supreme Court had recognized the authority of a court to impose sanctions against a party.
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (allowing
prevailing defendant to recover attorneys' fees when plaintiff in bad faith brings or maintains
meritless suit); Link v. Wabash Ry., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (recognizing that court may
levy sanctions against party for abuse of litigation system). The Roadway Express Court
extended the authority of courts to sanction by permitting courts directly to sanction an
attorney. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766.
In addition to sanctions that courts may impose as an exercise of inherent power, section
1927 of the Judiciary Code (section 1927), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.),
and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (F.R.A.P.) authorize courts to levy sanctions
against attorneys. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 1373 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (authorizing court to sanction attorney who
multiplies litigation); FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (authorizing a court to sanction an attorney who
signs a pleading in violation of F.R.C.P. 11); FED. R. App. P. 38 (authorizing court to
sanction attorney who makes frivolous appeal). Section 1927 provides for sanctions against an
attorney for multiplying litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); see infra note 5 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative history of § 1927); infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history and application of § 1927). Both the F.R.C.P. and the F.R.A.P. emipower
courts to sanction attorneys. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; FED. R. Crv. P. 16(f); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(g); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); FED. R. App. P. 38. Rule 11 of the F.R.C.P. requires an
attorney to sign every paper that the attorney files during the course of litigation. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides that the attorney's signature serves as certification that to the
best of the signing attorney's knowledge, the paper is factual and states a basis in existing law
or a good faith argument for modifying or reversing existing law. Id. Rule 11 provides,
further, that the attorney's signature certifies that the filing of the paper with the court is not
for an improper purpose. Id. Rule 11 authorizes a court to sanction the attorney or the party
when an attorney signs a paper in violation of Rule 11. Id. Rule 16 of the F.R.C.P. authorizes
courts to sanction a party or the party's attorney who fails to attend a pretrial conference.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(0. Rule 26(g) of the F.R.C.P. empowers courts to sanction parties or the
parties' attorney for abuse of the discovery process. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). Rule 37 of the
F.R.C.P. provides for sanctions against attorneys for failure to comply with discovery orders.
FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b). Additionally, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides for sanctions against a party or a party's attorney when the party or the party's
attorney makes a frivolous appeal. FED. R. App. P. 38.
2. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1267 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that sanctions
against attorneys are necessary to administration of judicial system and, by removing abuses
in litigation and promoting efficiency, provide means to make judicial system more efficient),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987). In Oliveri the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted that severe abuse of the litigation system may lead to penalties more
severe than monetary sanctions, such as contempt citations, proceedings by bar associations,
suspension, and disbarment. Id.
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Courts may sanction an attorney under the courts' inherent power, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or under statutory provisions author-
izing sanctions.3 Section 1927 of the Judiciary Code4 (section 1927) authorizes
courts to assess costs, including attorneys' fees, against counsel who unrea-
sonably and vexatiously multiply the litigation process. 5 In determining
3. See supra note I and accompanying text (noting authority of courts to sanction
attorneys under courts' inherent power, F.R.C.P., and § 1927).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Title 28 of the United States Code is entitled "Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure." Act of June 25, 1948, PuB. L. No. 80-773, 62 STAT. 869 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). In 1813 Congress enacted section 1927 of the Judiciary
Code to prevent attorneys from filing multiple suits when the matter only required a single
proceeding. 26 ANNAis OF CoNo. 29 (1813). A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to
the House of Representatives in 1842 suggested that section 1927 attempted to halt the practice
of United States attorneys, whose pay depended on the number of cases that the attorney
handled, of filing unnecessary lawsuits to increase compensation. H.R. Doc. No. 25, 27th
Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1842).
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper the Supreme Court held that sanctions under section
1927 did not include awards of attorneys' fees. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
763 (1980); see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing Roadway Express Court's
interpretation of § 1927). After the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express, Congress
amended section 1927 to include attorneys' fees in the costs that a court may assess against
an attorney under section 1927. See Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1154, 1156 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)) (including attorneys'
fees in scope of § 1927 sanction).
In amending section 1927 in 1980, Congress intended to prevent delays in litigation
proceedings. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws, 2716, 2782 (stating congressional intent in amending §
1927). The Senate version of the bill proposed that section 1927 allow courts to impose liability
on an attorney who intentionally acted to delay litigation proceedings or to increase litigation
costs. See S. 390, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 19,915 (1979) (proposed amendment
to § 1927 of Judiciary Code to impose sanction on attorneys who intentionally delay litigation
or increase litigation costs). The Senate version of section 1927 also would have required a
court to warn the attorney that the attorney's conduct violated section 1927. Id. The Senate
version, further, would have allowed a court to impose the section 1927 sanction only if the
attorney continued to delay the litigation or increase the costs. Id. The House version of the
Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 did not contain an amendment to section
1927. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, supra, at 8 (noting that House of Representatives did
not introduce amendment to § 1927 as part of Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of
1980).
In amending section 1927 Congress eventually adopted a compromise version reached by
the House and Senate Conference Committee on the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act
of 1980 (Conference Committee). Id. Congress failed to indicate, however, the appropriate
standard for courts to apply in determining whether to sanction attorneys under section 1927.
See id. (failing to discuss the proper standard under § 1927); Comment, Awards of Attorneys'
Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. Rav. 950, 951 (1980)
(noting that 1980 amendment to § 1927 did not establish standard for courts to apply for §
1927 sanction). The Conference Committee Report stated that the high standard required by
the 1980 amendment before courts could impose a section 1927 sanction would not hinder an
attorney in representing a client. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, supra, at 8. The Conference
Committee Report, however, does not define the high standard. See id. (containing no definition
of term "high standard"). In presenting the Conference Committee's compromise version of
UNREASONABLE AND VEXATIOUS
whether to sanction an attorney under section 1927, federal courts have
disagreed on the standard against which to measure an attorney's conduct
before a court may sanction the attorney by assessing attorneys' fees.
6
Section 1927 of the Judiciary Code authorizes a court to sanction an
attorney who delays the litigation process.7 Section 1927 provides for a
sanction only against the attorney and not against the party whom the
attorney represents.' The section 1927 sanction consists of the costs incurred
by the opposing party because of the offending attorney's delay.9 Section
1927 imposes a sanction on the vexatious attorney regardless of whether
the attorney represents the plaintiff or the defendant, or the prevailing or
losing party.'0 Section 1927 historically has provided for an attorney to be
section 1927, House members of the Conference Committee stated that because the Senate
version would have lowered the standard applicable to bad faith, the Conference Committee
rejected the Senate version of the amendment. See 126 CONG. REc. 23,627 (1980) (statement
of Rep. McClory) (stating that Senate version of amendment to § 1927 would have lowered
standard applicable to § 1927). Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law indicated, however, that the Senate version would have required bad faith.
Hearings on H.R. 3271, H.R. 4046, H.R. 4047, H.R. 4048, H.R. 4049, and H.R. 4050
Antitrust Procedural Improvements and Jurisdictional Amendments Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 61 (1979) (hereinafter Hearings) (statement of Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, United States
District Court Judge From the Northern District of California).
6. Compare Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (before imposing
§ 1927 sanction, court must find that attorney clearly acted with bad faith), cert. denied, 107
S.Ct 1373 (1987); Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that terms "vexatious and unreasonable" in § 1927 require courts to consider attorneys'
bad faith); and United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring court
to find that attorney acted recklessly or in bad faith); with In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984
(6th Cir. 1987) (imposing § 1927 sanctions when court objectively determined that regardless
of whether attorney acted in bad faith attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied
litigation), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1987) (No. 87-710); and
Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir.) (establishing that conduct
required for § 1927 sanction is vexatious multiplication of litigation), affd in part, vacated
and remanded in part, 722 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
7. See supra note 5 (discussing legislative history and application of § 1927 and noting
Congress' intent in enacting § 1927 to deter attorneys from delaying litigation process).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.
1986) (contrasting § 1927 that authorizes court only to sanction attorney with federal statutes
that shift attorneys' fees from one party to other party), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (providing that prevailing plaintiff in antitrust action may
recover reasonable attorneys' fees); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (providing that prevailing parties
in civil rights action may recover reasonable attorneys' fees); infra notes 24-25 and accompa-
nying text (noting that Congress has enacted statutes. that authorize awards of attorneys' fees
as exceptions to American Rule that prevailing party does not recover attorneys' fees).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Section 1927 authorizes a court to assess excess costs,
including attorneys' fees, incurred by an opposing party when an attorney delays litigation.
Id.
10. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980). The Roadway Express
Court noted that in determining whether to sanction an attorney under section 1927, a court
does not need to consider whether the attorney represents the prevailing party or the losing
party. Id.
1988]
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liable only for excess costs resulting from the attorney's multiplying the
proceedings."' Courts imposing section 1927 sanctions, however, traditionally
had not included attorneys' fees as a component of excess costs.' 2 Because
costs did not include attorneys' fees, sanctions under section 1927 involved
insignificant amounts, and consequently, very little litigation over section
1927 sanctions resulted. 3 In 1980, however, Congress amended section 1927
expressly to include attorneys' fees as a cost that courts could impose under
section 1927.14 Since the 1980 congressional amendment, parties more fre-
quently have attempted to invoke section 1927 sanctions."
Courts traditionally have applied the American Rule, which recognizes
that each party typically bears the cost of the party's attorneys' fees.1
6
Section 1927, however, is a departure from the general American Rule.'
7
Federal courts also have fashioned three exceptions to the American Rule
under which courts may allow a party to recover attorneys' fees.' 8 First, a
party who preserves or recovers a fund for the benefit of others (common
fund) may recover attorneys' fees from the fund or from the other parties
who benefit from the fund. 19 Second, a party may recover attorneys' fees
from an opposing party when the opposing party or the opposing party's
attorney has disobeyed a court order. 20 Third, a party may recover attorneys'
fees from an opposing party when the opposing party acts in bad faith.2 '
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the legislative and statutory history
of § 1927).
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Roadway Express Court's
interpretation of § 1927, before Congress amended § 1927, that excluded attorneys' fees from
definition of term "costs" in § 1927).
13. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that prior to
Congress' amendment in 1980, § 1927 did not include attorneys' fees, and, therefore, sanctions
under § 1927 did not involve large dollar amounts), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987).
14. See supra note 5 (discussing the legislative history of § 1927 and, in amending §
1927 in 1980, Congress' intent to include attorneys' fees in sanction under § 1927).
15. See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 (noting that since Congress in 1980 added attorneys'
fees to § 1927, courts have imposed § 1927 sanctions more frequently than before amendment).
16. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (noting
that rule in United States is that prevailing party ordinarily does not recover attorneys' fees
from losing party); F.D. Rich. Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 128-31 (1974) (affirming American Rule that each party pay own attorneys' fees);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) (recognizing
long standing general rule that party may not recover attorneys' fees).
17. See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1271, 1273 (discussing § 1927 as exception to American
Rule).
18. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975); see
infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (noting exceptions to American Rule).
19. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-97 (1970). The Supreme Court in
Mills defined the term "common fund" as a fund for the benefit of an entire class, such as
an estate. Id.
20. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923); see Alyeska,
421 U.S. at 258 (noting that award of attorneys' fees may be part of sanction imposed on
party or party's attorney for disobeying court order).
21. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59.
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In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society-2 the United States
Supreme Court refused to allow further judicially created exceptions to the
American Rule and held that only Congress should determine other situa-
tions in which courts can award attorneys' fees. 23 The Supreme Court in
Alyeska reasoned that by enacting statutes providing fTr a court to award
attorneys' fees to a party, Congress would exercise its authority to create
exceptions to the American Rule. 24 Congress has created exceptions to the
American Rule most notably in civil rights and antitrust cases. 25 Ordinarily,
a prevailing plaintiff in an antitrust or civil rights action automatically
recovers attorneys' fees from the defendant.
26
Although the Supreme Court in Alyeska and Congress had addressed
the sanction of attorneys' fees against a party for bad faith, neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress had addressed the sanction of attorneys' fees
against a party's attorney. 27 In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper-2 the United
States Supreme Court considered whether section 1927 or the bad faith
exception to the American Rule authorized a court to assess attorneys' fees
against counsel. 29 In Roadway Express two former employees of Roadway
Express, Inc. (Roadway) and an unsuccessful applicant for a position at
Roadway instituted a civil rights class action against Roadway alleging racial
discrimination in Roadway's employment practices. 30 The plaintiffs' attor-
neys failed to answer Roadway's interrogatories, failed to attend a hearing
on Roadway's motion for-an order compelling answers to the interrogatories,
and refused to comply with a court-ordered deadline for filing answers and
delayed, therefore, the litigation.3 1 Roadway successfully moved the district
court to dismiss the civil rights class action under Rule 37 of the Federal
22. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
23. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 241, 262 (1975).
24. See id. at 260 nn.32-35 (listing statutes that authorize awards of attorneys' fees);
supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting statutes that assess attorneys' fees against party).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (providing that prevailing plaintiff in antitrust action may
recover reasonable attorneys' fees from losing defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (providing
that prevailing parties in civil rights actions may recover reasonable attorneys' fees from losing
parties).
26. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (holding that unless
special circumstances make award unjust, prevailing plaintiff in civil rights action ordinarily
recovers attorneys' fees).
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that Alyeska Court held that courts
may assess attorneys' fees against party who acts in bad faith); supra note 24-25 and
accompanying text (noting that Congress has enacted statutes that authorize courts to assess
attorneys' fees against party). The Alyeska Court addressed only the issue of when a court
may assess attorneys' fees against a party. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260.
28. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
29. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper 447 U.S. 752, 754 (1980) (stating that Roadway
Express Court considered what powers courts may use to assess attorneys' fees against attorney).
30. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 754 (1980). The style of the case was
Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc. in the district court. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' suit filed
in district court). The plaintiff's attorneys appealed, but the plaintiff did not. Id. The style of'
the case on appeal, therefore, was Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper. Id.
31. Id. at 755.
1988]
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Rules of Civil Procedure and to award attorneys' fees and court costs under
section 1927.32 The district court in Roadway Express dismissed the action
with prejudice. 33 The district court, in a separate opinion, awarded Roadway
its attorneys' fees and costs and assessed the fees and costs against the
plaintiffs' attorneys. 34 The district court reasoned that sections 1988 and
2000e-5(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized a court to award
costs, including attorneys' fees, to a prevailing party.35 The district court
reasoned, further, that because the case was a civil rights class action, the
costs assessable under section 1927 also should include attorneys' fees. 36 The
district court assessed, therefore, the attorneys' fees and costs against the
plaintiffs' attorney.3 7 The plaintiffs successfully appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.3 8 On appeal the Fifth Circuit
ruled that section 1927 did not depend on the civil rights statutes for a
definition of the term "costs" and that section 1927 did not authorize
courts to assess attorneys' fees. 39 Subsequently, Roadway appealed the Fifth
Circuit's holding to the Supreme Court.40
On appeal the Supreme Court noted that Congress simultaneously
enacted sections 1920 and 1927 of the Judiciary Code. 41 The Roadway
Express Court also noted that section 1920 defines costs recoverable by a
prevailing party in federal courts. 42 The Roadway Express Court reasoned,
therefore, that to determine the appropriate scope of the term "costs" in
section 1927, courts must consider the scope of the tern "costs" in section
1920. 43 The Supreme Court noted that section 1920 does not include attor-
neys' fees as a component of recoverable costs. 44 The Roadway Express
Court concluded, therefore, that for courts to include attorneys' fees as
costs under section 1927 would exceed judicial authority.45 The Roadway
32. Id. at 755 & n.2.
33. Id.




38. See Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1979) (vacating
district court's decision to sanction plaintiff's attorney under § 1927), aff'd sub nom. Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
39. Id. at 1381.
40. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (affirming Fifth
Circuit's holding that § 1927 did not authorize courts to include attorneys' fees in § 1927
sanction).
41. See id. at 759-60 (discussing legislative history of §§ 1927 and 1920 and noting that
Congress enacted two sections together); see also supra note 5 (discussing legislative history of
§ 1927).
42. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 757.
43. Id. at 760-61. Section 1920 of the Judiciary Code allows prevailing parties to recover
specific costs, including fees of clerks, reporters, and witnesses, costs of printing, docket fees,
and compensation of court appointed experts. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982).
44. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 760-61 (noting that § 1920 does not include
attorneys' fees in definition of term "costs" recoverable by prevailing party).
45. Id. at 762.
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Express Court held, accordingly, that section 1927 does not authorize courts
to assess attorneys' fees against counsel. 46 Although refusing to include
attorneys' fees as costs under section 1927, the Roadway Express Court
held that the bad faith exception to the American Rule authorizes courts
to assess attorneys' fees directly against an attorney who conducts the
litigation in bad faith.47 The Roadway Express Court remanded, therefore,
the case to the district court to consider whether the attorney acted in bad
faith.
48
Because the Roadway Express Court did not recognize that courts could
sanction attorneys by assessing attorneys' fees under section 1927, the
Roadway Express Court did not consider the appropriate standard against
which to measure attorney conduct to determine whether to sanction an
attorney under section 1927. 41 Subsequent to Roadway Express, however,
Congress amended section 1927 to include attorneys' fees as part of recov-
erable costs under section 1927.50 Since the congressional amendment of
section 1927, courts inconsistently have applied section 1927.51 Some courts
hold that the standard under section 1927 is a high, subjective bad faith
standard.5 2 Other courts, however, hold that the section 1927 standard is a
low, objective unreasonableness standard.
5 3
In Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp.5 4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted two requirements for the imposition
of sanctions under section 1927. 55 In Suslick the plaintiff claimed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that in
handling an options trading account, the defendants had violated securities
46. Id. at 763.
47. See id. at 766 (holding that because court may sanction party litigating in bad faith
through award of attorneys' fees, court also may sanction party's attorney for intentionally
abusing litigation process).
48. Id. at 767-68.
49. See Comment, supra note 5, at 951, 954 (noting that Roadway Express Court held
that attorneys' fees were not recoverable under § 1927, and thus, did not consider proper
standard for courts to sanction attorneys under § 1927).
50. See supra note 5 (first, noting that after Supreme Court's decision in Roadway
Express, Congress in 1980 amended § 1927 and, second, discussing legislative history of
amendment to § 1927).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (comparing circuit courts differing interpre-
tations of standard that courts should apply in determining whether to sanction attorney under
§ 1927).
52. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring court to
find that attorney acted with bad faith), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987); Suslick v.
Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that for court to impose
§ 1927 liability court must find subjective bad faith).
53. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying objective standard to
determine whether to sanction attorney under § 1927); Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d
1287, 1292 (5th Cir.) (holding that § 1927 standard is objective), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 722 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
54. 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984).
55. Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp. 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1984).
19881
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laws. 6 The defendants, however, claimed that res judicata and the statute
of limitations barred the plaintiff's suit.5 7 The defendants, therefore, moved
the court to dismiss the complaint.58 The district court ruled that the statute
of limitations barred the action and, consequently, dismissed the suit.5 9 The
plaintiff then filed two amended complaints, but because the plaintiff failed
to allege a basis for tolling the statute of limitations, the court dismissed
both amended complaints.6 0 The defendants also successfully moved the
district court to award attorneys' fees to the defendants under section 1927
and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61 Both the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's attorney appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 62 On appeal
the Seventh Circuit concluded that for section 1927 to apply, first, the
attorney's conduct must multiply the litigation, and, second, the attorney's
conduct must be unreasonable and vexatious. 63 The Seventh Circuit ruled
that for a court to deem an attorney's conduct unreasonable and vexatious,
the court must find that the attorney acted in bad faith 4 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the complex interaction between state and federal law
concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations in securities cases gave
rise to the possibility that the plaintiff would prevail on the securities
claim. 65 The Seventh Circuit refused, therefore, to conclude that the attor-
ney's actions amounted to bad faith.66 The Seventh Circuit held, accordingly,
that no basis existed for sanctioning the attorney under section 1927.67 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, therefore, the district court's assessment of attor-
neys' fees under section 1927 against the plaintiff's attorney. 68
56. Id. at 1002. In Suslick the plaintiff was the executrix of her husband's estate. Id.
The defendants managed an options trading account on behalf of the decedent. Id. The
plaintiff sued the defendants and claimed that the defendants violated several securities laws
in the handling of the decedent's account. Id.
57. Id. The Suslick court noted that the plaintiff had brought a prior action, which
alleged securities law violations, on behalf of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's children as the
decedent's heirs. Id. at 1002 n.1. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois had dismissed the previous action because the plaintiff failed to bring the suit within
the time required by the statute of limitations. Id. The defendants claimed that the previous
action rendered the issue raised by the plaintiff in the present action res judicata. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. In Suslick the district court noted that the plaintiff failed to allege any facts that
would have tolled the statute of limitations. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1002-03.
62. Id. at 1003.
63. See id. at 1006 (indicating that § 1927 requires that attorney both delay litigation
and unreasonably and vexatiously cause delay).
64. Id. The Suslick court noted that although lack of merit in a suit evidences bad faith,
the claim must be without a credible basis in law before the court may assess attorneys' fees
under section 1927. See id. (noting that complexity of statute of limitations issues in securities




68. Id. The Suslick court also held that Rule 11 of the F.R.C.P. requires a court to find
UNREASONABLE AND VEXATIOUS
Agreeing with the Suslick court's interpretation of section 1927, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Oliveri v.
Thompson69 adopted a bad faith standard for sanctioning an attorney under
section 1927.70 In Oliveri the plaintiff claimed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York that by using excessive force,
police had effected an unconstitutional arrest of the plaintiff.7' At trial the
jury found for the defendants on all claims. 72 The defendants then moved
the district court to sanction under section 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney for filing
a meritless action and continuing the prosecution knowing that the claims
were without basis. 73 The district court in Oliveri awarded attorneys' fees
to the defendant and assessed the attorneys' fees under section 1927 against
the plaintiff's attorney.74 The plaintiff's attorney appealed to the Second
Circuit.7s The Second Circuit noted that Roadway Express established courts'
inherent power to sanction an attorney, as well as a party, who acts in bad
faith.76 The Second Circuit reasohed, however, that section 1927 differed
from the courts' inherent power to sanction in that a court could sanction
only an attorney under section 1927. 77 The Second Circuit concluded,
therefore, that section 1927 could apply only when the attorney acted in
bad faith.78 The Second Circuit held, accordingly, that the district court's
findings did not meet the bad faith standard that section 1927 requires.
79
The Second Circuit reversed, therefore, the district court's sanction against
the plaintiff's attorney.8
0
bad faith. Id. at 1007. Because the court did not find bad faith, the Suslick court reversed
the district court award of attorneys' fees as a sanction under Rule 11. Id. at 1007; see supra
note 1 (discussing the requirements of Rule 11 of the F.R.C.P.).
69. 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct 1373 (1987).
70. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1373 (1987). The Oliveri court noted that the Second Circuit always did not make the bad
faith requirement for sanctioning an attorney under section 1927 explicit. Id.; see Cheng v.
GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886, 891 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that court does not need to decide
whether § 1927 requires bad faith or simply unreasonableness). The Second Circuit in Oliveri
clearly stated that the Second Circuit applies a bad faith standard when determining whether
to sanction an attorney under section 1927. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273.
71. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1269.
72. Id. at 1270.
73. Id. at 1270-71.
74. Id. at 1271. In Oliveri the district court also based impositions of sanctions against
the plaintiff's attorney on Rule 11 of the F.R.C.P. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (authorizing
court to sanction attorney who signs pleading which has no legal or factual basis).
75. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1271.
76. Id. at 1273.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1277. In Oliveri the district court stated that the plaintiff's testimony was
completely incredible. Id. at 1270. The Second Circuit noted, however, that section 1927 did
not require a sanction against an attorney whose judgment of the client's credibility conflicted
with the district court's perception of the client's credibility. Id. at 1277-78.
80. Id. at 1281.
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 45:249
Disagreeing with the Second Circuit in Oliveri and the Seventh Circuit
in Suslick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In
re Ruben"1 considered whether the section 1927 sanction standard should be
a subjective, bad faith standard or an objective, unreasonableness standard. 82
In Ruben the plaintiff filed a sex discrimination claim in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 3 At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the defendants successfully moved the court to dismiss the
plaintiff's sex discrimination claim pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 84 The defendants then successfully moved the
court to award attorneys' fees to the defendants and assess the fees under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 1927.5 The
plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney appealed to the Sixth Circuit.8 6 On
appeal the Sixth Circuit ruled that section 1927 requires an objective
determination that despite the absence of impropriety, the attorney unrea-
sonably and vexatiously multiplied the litigation process.8 7 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that by enacting section 1927, Congress intended to prevent dilatory
litigation tactics.8 8 The Sixth Circuit noted that attorneys cannot ethically
burden the federal courts by bringing meritless actions or delaying the
litigation process.8 9 The Sixth Circuit reasoned, therefore, that an objective
standard under section 1927 would not cause an attorney to violate the
attorney's ethical duty to represent zealously the client.9° The Sixth Circuit
concluded, therefore, that when an attorney multiplies the proceedings, a
81. 825 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1987).
82. In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3356 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1987) (No. 87-710).
83. Id. at 980.
84. Id. at 981. In Ruben the district court determined that the plaintiff's case was
without factual or legal basis. Id. at 980 n.2. The district court did not indicate, however,
whether the plaintiff in bad faith brought or maintained the suit. Id. at 981.
85. Id. In Ruben the district court did not indicate clearly the grounds for sanctioning
the attorney, but the Ruben court noted courts' sanctioning authority under courts' inherent
power, section 1927, and Rule 11 of the F.R.C.P. Id.; see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper
447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (holding that under courts' inherent power, court may sanction
attorney who acts in bad faith); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (providing that court may sanction
attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies litigation); FED. R. Cxv. P. 11 (providing
that court may sanction attorney who signs pleading that is not, to best of attorney's knowledge,
well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, or interposed for proper purpose).
86. See Ruben, 825 F.2d at 991 (reversing district court's sanction against plaintiff and
remanding case to district court for reconsideration of § 1927 sanction against plaintiff's
attorney).
87. Id. at 984.
88. Id. at 983.
89. Id. at 984; see infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing attorneys' ethical
obligations in representing clients); infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing
objective standard's effect on attorney's ethical obligations to client).
90. See Ruben, 825 F.2d at 984 (noting that because ethical obligation zealously to
represent client does not include pursuing frivolous claims or multiplying litigation on behalf
of client, objective standard does not deter attorneys from fulfilling ethical obligations).
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court may impose sanctions on the attorney under section 1927 regardless
of the attorney's motive. 9' The Sixth Circuit remanded, consequently, the
case to the district court for reconsideration of sanctions under the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of section 1927.92
In accord with the Sixth Circuit in Ruben, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc.9a established
the standard for determining whether to sanction the attorney under section
1927 as vexatious multiplication of the litigation process. 94 In Lewis the
plaintiff filed a civil rights suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. 9s The plaintiff alleged that Brown & Root, Inc.
(Brown & Root) engaged in racial discrimination in hiring and promoting
employees. 96 The district court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution
when the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney failed to appear for trial.
97
The district court subsequently granted, however, the plaintiff's motion for
reinstatement. 9s The plaintiff further delayed the proceedings because the
plaintiff failed to appear on time for the rescheduled trial, and neither the
plaintiff nor the plaintiff's counsel returned to trial following a recess. 99
The district court dismissed the case both as unsupported by the evidence
and for want of prosecution.' ° The district court awarded attorneys' fees
to the defendant and assessed the fees under section 1927 against the
plaintiff's attorney.'0' The plaintiff's attorney appealed to the Fifth Cir-
91. Id. The Ruben court noted, however, that a trial judge's frustration with an attorney
does not provide a basis for a section 1927 sanction. Id. The Ruben court reasoned that
section 1927 requires an attorney's act that causes delay and creates excess costs for the
opposing party. Id.
92. Id. at 991. In Ruben the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court did not determine
the impact of the attorney's misconduct on the defendants. Id. at 990. The court directed,
therefore, that the district judge consider the extent to which the plaintiff's attorney's actions
caused the defendants to incur excess costs and attorneys' fees. Id.
93. 711 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded in part, 722
F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den., 464 U.S. 1069 (1984).
94. Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, vacated
in part and remanded in part, 722 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069
(1984).
95. Id. at 1288.
96. Id. at 1288-89.
97. Id. at 1289.
98. Id. In Lewis the plaintiff's motion to reinstate the lawsuit stated that the plaintiff's
failure to appear resulted from counsel's mistake and failure to record the scheduled trial date.
Id.
99. Id. In Lewis the district court had granted the recess at the request of the plaintiff's
counsel. Id. Because the plaintiff's attorney had indicated that the plaintiff had called the
plaintiff's only witness, the plaintiff's attorney indicated that after the recess the attorney
would need only a short time to conclude the presentation of the plaintiff's case. Id. Before
dismissing the case, the district court, consequently, awaited for fifteen minutes the return of
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Lewis noted that the district
court dismissed the case for lack of evidentiary support for plaintiff's allegations and for
failure to prosecute. Id.
100. Id. at 1289.
101. Id.
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cuit. °2 On appeal the Fifth Circuit ruled that unless clearly erroneous, the
Fifth Circuit must affirm the district court's sanction of the attorney. 03
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the correct standard under section 1927 is
vexatious multiplication of litigation.104 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court that by failing to appear for the trial and failing to return to
trial after a recess, the plaintiff's attorney irresponsibly and vexatiously
multiplied the litigation. 0 5 The Fifth Circuit held, accordingly, that the
district court correctly sanctioned the plaintiff's attorney under section
1927.106
Although courts agree that an attorney must multiply the litigation
process before a court may sanction the attorney under section 1927, courts
disagree on whether to apply a subjective bad faith standard or an objective
unreasonableness standard in determining whether to sanction an attorney
under section 1927.107 Courts characterize the bad faith standard as a high
standard and the objective standard as a low standard. 0 8 Courts interpreting
section 1927 to require bad faith on the part of an attorney before sanc-
tioning the attorney present a variety of reasons to support the courts'
choice of the bad faith standard.' ° 9 First, courts reason that courts should
apply the same standard in sanctioning attorneys under section 1927 as
under the courts' inherent power.110 Second, courts recognize that when
considered in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Roadway Express,
the legislative history of the 1980 amendment to section 1927 supports the
courts' application of a bad faith standard in sanctioning attorneys under
section 1927."' "Third, courts recognize exceptions to the American Rule,
other than the bad faith exception, only in situations that generate common
funds or for which a statute specifically provides for a fee award to the
prevailing party." 2 Thus, courts recognize that because section 1927 is not
a statute that allows the prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees or that
generates common funds, bad faith must be the section 1927 standard.' 3
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1292 & n.7.
104. Id. at 1292.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (comparing courts that require bad faith
before sanctioning an attorney under § 1927 with courts that do not require bad faith).
108. See McCandless v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1983)
(characterizing objective standard as lower standard than bad faith standard).
109. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of courts that
require bad faith).
110. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (comparing § 1927
sanction to inherent power sanction).
111. See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that legislative history
of § 1927 indicates that Congress intended to adopt bad faith standard in amending § 1927).
112. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text (discussing American Rule, which
recognizes that prevailing parties do not recover attorneys' fees and exceptions to American
Rule).
113. See TCI, 769 F.2d at 445 (concluding that § 1927 is not statute that permits award
of attorneys' fees to prevailing party and, therefore, that bad faith should be § 1927 standard).
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Finally, courts reason that an attorney's ethical obligations to clients require
that courts apply the bad faith standard."
4
In contending that the standard for section 1927 sanctions should be
the same as the standard for courts' inherent power sanctions, courts reason
that only one significant difference exists between a section 1927 sanction
and an inherent power sanction." 5 Under section 1927 courts may assess a
sanction only against an attorney." 6 Under the courts' inherent power to
sanction, however, courts may assess a sanction against either the party or
the party's attorney."7 Courts, therefore, reason that because under the
inherent power courts may sanction a party or the party's attorney only
when the party or the attorney acts in bad faith, a court should sanction
an attorney under section 1927 only when the attorney acts in bad faith."8
Courts applying the bad faith standard also reason that courts should
examine the legislative history of the 1980 amendment to section 1927 in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Roadway Express. " 9 Courts relying
on the legislative history of section 1927 note that the House and Senate
Conference Committee on the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of
1980 (Conference Committee), which considered the 1980 amendment to
section 1927, indicated in the Conference Committee Report that section
1927 requires a high standard of bad faith before courts may impose
sanctions. 20 The courts reason, therefore, that the reference to a high
standard refers to the Supreme Court's admonishment in Roadway Express
that courts should not assess lightly sanctions.' 2 ' Although the Roadway
114. Id. at 447. The Seventh Circuit in TCI reasoned that if an attorney knows that a
court will apply an objective standard in determining whether to sanction the attorney under
section 1927, the attorney would hesitate to represent zealously a client Id. The TCI court
concluded, therefore, that the use of an objective standard under § 1927 would impede
attorneys in fulfilling ethical obligations to clients. Id. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsmrrY Canon 7 (1980). The American Bar Association Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (the "Model Code") requires an attorney to represent zealously a client within the
bounds of the law. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONA REsPoNrsin~rrY Canon 7 (1980). Additionally,
the disciplinary rules of the Model Code prohibit an attorney from filing an action or delaying
litigation proceedings to simply harass or injure the opposing party. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
sIONAL RsPoNsmIrrY DR 1-102 (1980).
115. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that courts'
inherent power allows courts to sanction party or party's counsel, whereas under § 1927 court
may sanction only party's attorney), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 (noting that § 1927 only
authorizes sanction against attorney).
117. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273.
118. See id. (reasoning that because § 1927 sanction is virtually identical to inherent power
sanction, standard for § 1927 sanction should be identical to standard for inherent power
sanction).
119. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing legislative
history of § 1927 and Roadway Express), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987).
120. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that § 1927 requires high
standard before court may impose sanctions on attorney).
121. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (indicating that courts
should not impose sanctions on attorneys without careful consideration).
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Express Court did not address the s*tandard applicable to section 1927, the
Supreme Court did require bad faith as the standard for assessing sanctions
under the inherent power. 2 2 Courts reason, therefore, that because Roadway
Express preceded the 1980 amendment to section 1927, Congress must have
intended the bad faith standard required by the Roadway Express Court
before sanctioning an attorney under courts' inherent power to apply to
sanctions against an attorney under section 1927.123 The courts rationalize,
therefore, that Congress recognized bad faith to be the applicable standard
for courts' imposing sanctions under section 1927.24 Additionally, in pre-
senting the Conference Committee Report to the House during debate on
the compromise version of the 1980 amendment to section 1927, House
members of the Conference Committee stated that because the Senate version
would have applied a lower standard to section 1927 than the standard
under Roadway Express, the Conference Committee did not adopt the
Senate version of section 1927.121
In addition to supporting a bad faith standard with the legislative
history of the 1980 amendment to section 1927, courts justify a bad faith
standard by recognizing that statutes which award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party do not require bad faith, but reasoning that section 1927
is not a statute that awards fees. 126 For support, courts note that the
Supreme Court in Roadway Express clearly indicated that section 1927 does
not distinguish between a prevailing party and a losing party. 2 7 Courts
reason that section 1927 operates to penalize an attorney, rather than to
reward a prevailing party. 28 Courts reason, further, that section 1927 simply
permits a court to assess fees directly against a party's attorney, rather than
122. See id. at 766 (noting that court may assess sanctions under inherent power against
attorney who acts in bad faith); see also supra note I and accompanying text (discussing
Roadway Express Court's recognition of inherent power of courts to sanction attorney whom
court finds to have acted in bad faith).
123. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (stating that court must find that attorney
acted in bad faith before sanctioning attorney); supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting
that Congress amended § 1927 after Roadway Express).
124. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (stating that court must find attorney acted
in bad faith before sanctioning attorney); supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that
Congress amended § 1927 after Roadway Express).
125. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 1980
amendment to § 1927 and noting statements by House of Representatives leaders that because
Senate version of § 1927 would have established standard lower than bad faith for imposing
§ 1927 sanctions, Conference Committee rejected Senate version of § 1927).
126. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271, 1273 (2nd Cir. 1986) (reasoning that
because § 1927 does not assess prevailing party's attorneys' fees against losing party, § 1927
is not statutory exception to American Rule), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987); supra notes
16-26 and accompanying text (discussing American Rule and exceptions to American Rule).
127. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273.
128. See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985) (notipg that § 1927 only
operates as penalty against attorney); see also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1271 (noting that distinction
between awarding fees as damages and assessing fees as sanctions is unclear).
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against the party.' 29 Courts conclude, therefore, that because section 1927
is not a statute that allows a fee award, section 1927 must be an extension
of the bad faith exception to the American Rule. 30
Furthermore, courts support the bad faith standard by reasoning that
an attorney could not fulfill an attorney's ethical obligations to a client
under an objective standard.' Courts note that an attorney has an ethical
duty zealously to represent his client. 32 Courts reason that because a court
more likely would sanction an attorney under section 1927 when applying
an objective standard, an objective standard may cause attorneys either to
hesitate to represent a client or in representing a client, to act less zeal-
ously.' Courts that require bad faith also note that the Conference Com-
mittee Report stated that a high standard for imposing sanctions under.
section 1927 would allow attorneys to fulfill their ethical obligations to their
clients.
3 4
Although some courts find several justifications for applying the sub-
jective, bad faith standard, courts interpreting section 1927 to require an
objective determination that the attorney unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied the litigation present several arguments to support the objective
standard. 35 First, the Supreme Court in Roadway Express intended to
distinguish between the bad faith standard for an inherent power sanction
and the objective standard in statutory provisions authorizing courts' award
of attorneys' fees.136 Second, courts recognize that the language of section
1927 supports the use of an objective standard.' 37 Third, the legislative
129. See In re TCI, 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that § 1927 authorizes
court to assess attorneys' fees against offending attorney, rather than against attorney's client).
130. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (indicating that Roadway Express Court
viewed inherent power sanction against attorney as extension of inherent power to sanction
party which is exception to American Rule).
131. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing attorney's ethical obligations
to client and reasoning that objective standard would impede attorneys in fulfilling ethical
obligations to clients).
132. See id. (disc6,sing attorney's ethical obligation zealously to represent client).
133. TCI, 769 F.2d at 447. The Seventh Circuit in TCI suggested that an objective
standard could cause an attorney to be less than zealous in representing a client for fear that
zealous representation would lead to section 1927 sanctions. Id. The court reasoned that under
a bad faith standard, the attorney more easily could fulfill the attorney's ethical obligations
to the client. Id.
134. H.R. CoNO. REP. No. 1234, supra note 5, at 8. The Conference Committee Report
stated that because the high standard would not make attorneys afraid to pursue claims on
behalf of their clients as might a lower standard, the high standard required under section
1927 would allow attorneys to fulfill ethical obligations zealously to represent clients. Id.
135. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 983-84 (6th Cir. 1987) (justifying courts choice of
objective standard in determining whether to impose § 1927 sanction on attorney), petition
for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1987) (No. 87-710); infra notes 158-61 and
accompanying text (noting reasoning of courts applying objective standard to § 1927).
136. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980) (discussing standards
applicable to provisions of §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964, both of which
authorize prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees).
137. See Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
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history of the 1980 amendment to section 1927 supports an objective
standard in imposing section 1927 sanctions.'38 Fourth, the statutory excep-
tions to the American Rule do not require bad faith, and because section
1927 is a statutory exception to the American Rule, section 1927 does not
require bad faith. 3 9 Fifth, an objective, unreasonableness standard would
not cause an attorney to hesitate to fulfill the attorney's ethical obligations
to the client. 40 Finally, courts applying the objective standard disagree with
the logic of bad faith courts that section 1927 shifts an assessment of
attorneys' fees from the party to the party's attorney.'
4'
Courts recognize that the Roadway Express Court distinguished between
the subjective bad faith standard for an inherent power sanction and the
objective unreasonableness standard for a statutory fee award.142 Because
the district court in Roadway Express had based the sanction against the
plaintiff's attorney on section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well
as on section 1927, the Supreme Court distinguished between sections 1927
and 1988.' 43 The Roadway Express Court noted that section 1988 allows a
court to assess attorneys' fees against a plaintiff for vexatious litigation.'4
The Roadway Express Court noted, further, that the vexatious litigation
standard under section 1988 does not require that the party act in bad
faith. 145 Courts conclude, therefore, that because the Supreme Court did
not define the term "vexatious" to require bad faith in awarding attorneys'
fees in a civil rights action, the use of the term "vexatious" in section 1927
also does not require bad faith.
46
§ 1927 requires objective determination that attorney knew or should have known that action
was frivolous or that attorney's conduct would cause delays).
138. See supra note 5 (noting that Congress adopted 1980 amendment to § 1927 after
Supreme Courts decision in Roadway Express).
139. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of courts that §
1927 is statutory exception to American Rule and, therefore, does not require bad faith
standard).
140. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (reasoning that objective standard
would not cause attorney not to fulfill ethical duties to client).
141. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 982 n.5 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting disagreement with
Oliveri court's bad faith standard), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 17,
1987) (No. 87-710); infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (disagreeing with reasoning of
bad faith courts that § 1927 shifts assessment of attorneys' fees from party to party's attorney).
142. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980) (distinguishing § 1927
sanction from §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k) awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in civil
rights actions).
143. Id.
144. See id. (noting that prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions ordinarily recover
attorneys' fees, but prevailing defendants only recover attorneys' fees when the plaintiff engages
in vexatious litigation).
145. Id. The Roadway Express Court implied that the vexatiousness standard under section
1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not require bad faith. Id.
146. Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1291-1292 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part
vacated in part and remanded in part, 722 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1069 (1984). The Fifth Circuit in Lewis reasoned that because the Supreme Court in Roadway
Express had noted that the term "vexatious" does not require bad faith, courts should define
the term "vexatious" in section 1927 to not require bad faith.
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Courts also justify an objective standard from the language of section
1927.' 47 Courts note that because section 1927 does not contain language
requiring intentional acts by the attorney, courts should not apply a sub-
jective standard to a section 1927 sanction.1 41 Moreover, the version of
section 1927 originally proposed by the Senate required that the attorney
intentionally multiply the litigation.' 49 The Conference Committee's rejection
of the term "intentionally" in the Senate bill, therefore, supports the
conclusion that, in determining whether to impose section 1927-sanctions,
courts should not consider the attorney's motivation for delaying the pro-
ceedings. 50
In addition to distinguishing between an inherent power sanction and a
section 1927 sanction and supporting an objective standard from the lan-
guage of section 1927, courts applying the objective standard conclude that
the legislative history of section 1927 supports an objective standard. 5' The
legislative history does not contain any evidence that in amending section
1927, Congress considered the bad faith requirement of Roadway Express.
52
Because the Senate proposed the section 1927 amendment in 1979 before
the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express, Congress could not have
relied on the Roadway Express decision to define the standard for courts
to apply to section 1927.13 Moreover, testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee indicated that the Senate version of section 1927 would have
required bad faith. 5 4 The Conference Committee subsequently refused to
adopt the Senate version of the amendment to section 1927, and conse-
quently, rejected the bad faith standard. 5 The courts assume, further, that
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing language of § 1927 and
noting courts' reasoning that language supports applying objective standard to determine
whether to sanction attorney under § 1927).
148. See In re Jaques, 761 F.2d 302, 306 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that language of § 1927
does not require intent and reasoning, therefore, that attorney's intent to multiply litigation
proceedings required under bad faith standard is not relevant to § 1927 sanctions).
149. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of § 1927 and
noting that Congress rejected Senate version of § 1927, which required that attorney inten-
tionally multiply litigation before court could impose § 1927 sanction).
150. See id. (noting that Conference Committee rejected Senate version of amendment of
§ 1927); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee urged the House to reject the Senate version of the amendment
to § 1927 because the Senate version would require bad faith).
151. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text (noting courts' reasoning that legislative
history of 1980 amendment to § 1927 and Congress' intent in amending § 1927 support
applying objective standard to determine whether to sanction attorney under § 1927).
152. See supra note 5 (discussing legislative history of 1980 amendment to § 1927); infra
note 153 and accompanying text (noting that because Senate proposed amendment to § 1927
before the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express, Senate did not consider Roadway Express
in deciding to amend § 1927).
153. See S. 390, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 19,915 (1979) (preceding Supreme
Court's decision in Roadway Express, which did not occur until 1980).
154. See Hearings, supra note 5 at 61 (stating that Senate's amendment to § 1927 would
have adopted bad faith standard, rather than objective standard for imposing § 1927 sanctions).
155. See supra note 5 (noting that legislative history of 1980 amendment to § 1927
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Congress intended to give courts a new source of authority to sanction
attorneys, rather than simply to codify the existing inherent power to
sanction. 5 6 Courts reason, therefore, that if Congress had intended for
courts to sanction attorneys only when the courts find that the attorneys
acted in bad faith, Congress did not need to amend section 1927.157 Courts
conclude, consequently, that because the Roadway Express Court had
recognized the inherent power of courts to sanction attorneys acting in bad
faith, Congress amended section 1927 to adopt a lesser standard under
which courts could impose sanctions.
1 5 8
Furthermore, courts applying the objective standard reason that the
legislative history indicates that Congress' intent in amending section 1927
to deter litigation delays is evident in the other portions of the Antitrust
Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 (the "Act") and in the portion of
the Act that amended section 1927.159 The Act also amended the Clayton
Act to authorize courts to award prejudgment interest. 60 By authorizing the
award of prejudgment interest under the Clayton Act, Congress intended
to discourage attorneys from using litigation tactics solely to delay litiga-
tion.16 1 Courts reason, therefore, that Congress' primary intent in passing
the Act was to discourage attorneys from delaying litigation.162 The courts
conclude, consequently, that the objective standard furthers Congress' intent
in enacting section 1927.163
indicates that Senate's amendment would have adopted subjective bad faith standard, rather
than objective unreasonableness standard for imposing § 1927 sanctions).
156. Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit
in Jones reasoied that Congress intended the 1980 amendment to section 1927 to give courts
a new source of sanctioning authority. Id. The court reasoned, further, that applying a bad
faith standard to section 1927 would not give courts any new power, but rather that the 1980
amendment to section 1927 simply would codify the inherent power of courts to sanction an
attorney. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that courts must use an objective standard under
section 1927 to fulfill Congress' intent to add to the inherent power. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (recognizing inherent
power of court to sanction attorney who acts in bad faith); see also supra notes 120-25 and
accompanying text (discussing relationship between Roadway Express and 1980 amendment to
§ 1927).
159. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that by amending § 4 of
Clayton Act to award prejudgment interest in antitrust cases, and thus, providing incentives
not to prolong litigation, Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 will deter litigation
delays).
160. See id. (discussing provision of Act authorizing award of prejudgment interest to
prevailing plaintiffs in antitrust actions).
161. See id. (noting that award of prejudgment interest will deter attorneys from delaying
litigation).
162. See Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that
objective standard will deter litigation delays by allowing sanction against attorney when
attorney should know that claim is frivolous or tactics will multiply litigation); H.R. CoNrF.
REP. No. 1234, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that Congress intended Act to deter attorneys from
engaging in litigation delays).
163. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussingOliveri court's application
of § 1927 and noting that bad faith standard thwarts congressional intent of § 1927).
UNREASONABLE AND VEXATIOUS
Aside from supporting the objective standard from the legislative history
of section 1927, courts reason that because the standards applicable to other
statutory exceptions to the American Rule do not require a court to find
bad faith, section 1927 should not require a court to find bad faith.' 4 The
statutes providing for awards of attorneys' fees in antitrust and civil rights
cases may represent an intentional legislative decision that defendants whom
courts find to have violated the antitrust or civil rights laws should com-
pensate the plaintiff for attorneys' fees that the plaintiff expended in
enforcing the antitrust or civil rights laws. 65 The antitrust and civil rights
statutes do not require bad faith by the defendant or the defendant's
attorney for a court to award attorneys' fees.'6 When amending section
1927 to include the award of attorneys' fees, Congress may have made a
similar conscious legislative choice not to require bad faith. 67 The legislative
history of section 1927 indicates that in amending section 1927, Congress
intended to end multiplicative and dilatory litigation tactics by assessing
attorneys' fees against counsel who use these tactics. 68 Courts reason that
because a court may assess attorneys' fees against an antitrust or civil rights
defendant whom the court finds to have violated the antitrust or civil rights
laws, a court, accordingly, may sanction an attorney whom the court finds
unreasonably and vexatiously to have multiplied the litigation.' 69
Responding to the bad faith courts' reasoning that an objective standard
would cause an attorney not to fulfill the attorney's ethical duties to the
client, courts applying the objective, unreasonableness standard state that
the objective standard would not cause an attorney to hesitate to fulfill the
164. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (noting examples of statutory exceptions
to American Rule and indicating that court may award attorneys' fees).
165. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975)
(discussing statutory exceptions to American Rule). The Alyeska Court recognized that to
implement public policy, Congress had decided to rely on private enforcement of the antitrust
and civil rights laws. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned, further, that awards of attorneys' fees
encourage private litigants to bring actions to enforce the antitrust and civil rights laws. 'Id.
166. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (holding that
prevailing defendant in civil rights action only recovers attorneys' fees when plaintiff's claim
was frivolous); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (holding that unless
special circumstances make award of attorneys' fees unjust prevailing plaintiff in civil rights
action ordinarily recovers attorneys' fees).
167. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 1980
amendment to § 1927 and noting that Conference Committee rejected Senate version of §
1927 that would have required bad faith standard); Hearings, supra note 5, at 61 (indicating
that Senate version of § 1927 would require courts to apply a bad faith standard to determine
whether to sanction attorney under § 1927).
168. See supra note 5 (noting that legislative history of 1980 amendment to § 1927
indicates that § 1927 was only one of several measures enacted to end delays by attorneys in
litigation process); supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent
to deter litigation delays in enacting Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980).
169. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that in light of
legislative history of 1980 amendment to § 1927, Congress' intent was only to require that
attorney unreasonably and vexatiously delay litigation before court may impose § 1927 sanction
on attorney), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1987) (No. 87-710).
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attorney's duties to the client. 170 Courts reason that an attorney's profes-
sional responsibilities to the client do not extend to pursuing frivolous claims
or employing dilatory litigation tactics on behalf of the client.' 7 ' Courts
also recognize that in addition to zealously representing the client, an
attorney owes a duty to the legal system not to exceed the bounds of the
law.' 72 Courts conclude, therefore, that an objective standard allows an
attorney to fulfill his ethical duties to the legal system and to the client.
1 73
In addition to responding to the bad faith courts' reasoning that the
objective standard would cause an attorney not to fulfill the attorney's
ethical duties to the client, courts that apply the objective standard to
section 1927 respond to the reasoning of bad faith courts that courts may
interpret section 1927 as shifting an assessment of attorneys' fees from a
party to the party's counsel.' 74 First, section 1927 addresses the actions of
attorneys, rather than the actions of a party. 75 Second, the attorney may
cause needless delays in litigation by, for example, failing to respond to the
opposing party's discovery requests in a timely fashion as a litigation strategy
that the attorney believes will achieve the client's goals, rather than pursuant
to the client's instructions. 76 Thus, by reasoning that section 1927 transfers
a sanction from the client to the client's attorney, courts ignore the possi-
bility that an attorney acts independently of his client.'
77
Although courts that support the subjective, bad faith standard and
courts that support the objective, unreasonableness standard both reason
that the legislative history supports the courts' use of either position, the
objective standard better fulfills the objective of Congress in amending
section 1927.178 The legislative history of the 1980 amendment to section
170. See id. at 984 (reasoning that zealous advocacy does not require attorney to delay
litigation or multiply proceedings).
171. See Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that
attorney's ethical obligations do not extend to maintaining frivolous actions or engaging in
litigation tactics that delay proceedings or harass opposing party).
172. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing ethical standards for attorney
in zealously representing a client).
173. See Jones, 789 F.2d at 1230 (recognizing that attorney who violates § 1927 by
delaying litigation, increasing costs, and bringing and maintaining frivolous actions has exceeded
ethical duty zealously to represent client).
174. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (noting that § 1927 does not shift
liability from party to party's attorney and that the delays caused by party's attorney may be
independent of party's direction).
175. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1912) (noting that
regardless of reprehensibility of party's conduct, court may only sanction party's attorney
under § 1927).
176. See McKirdy, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 - Counselor Beware, 71 ILL. B.J. 708, 710 (1983)
(noting that § 1927 protects party from responsibility for costs that party's attorney has caused
independent of client's direction).
177. See id. (noting that attorneys may act independently of clients).
178. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1234, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that Congress intended
§ 1927 to deter attorneys who delay litigation); infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text
(reasoning that under subjective standard court will not always sanction attorneys who delay
litigation, and, therefore, subjective standard does not fulfill Congress' intent).
UNREASONABLE AND VEXATIOUS
1927 clearly indicates that Congress intended to deter attorneys from need-
lessly delaying litigation. 79 Courts applying the subjective, bad faith standard
cannot fulfill Congress' goal to deter litigation delays because courts typically
conclude that an attorney's conduct that results in a litigation delay does
not amount to bad faith.'80 For example, in Oliveri the Second Circuit
found that the plaintiff's case was without merit, and that the plaintiff's
attorney continued to litigate the case.' 8' Because the Oliveri court applied
the subjective, bad faith standard, the court concluded that the plaintiff's
attorney did not continue to litigate in bad faith, and, consequently, reversed
the sanction against the attorney. 82 If the Oliveri court had applied the
objective, unreasonableness standard, however, the Oliveri court likely would
have concluded that the attorney met the standard and likely would have
sanctioned the attorney under section 1927.183 The objective standard, there-
fore, would have fulfilled Congress' intent to deter litigation delays, but
the subjective standard allowed the attorney to delay without fear of a
sanction. Because Congress intended to prevent litigation delays, the courts
applying the bad faith standard thwart the congressional intent of section
1927.184
The different standards applied by the federal courts in imposing section
1927 sanctions affect how an attorney conducts a case. 85 Courts applying
the bad faith standard allow practitioners to delay the litigation process
without penalty, provided that the practitioner intentionally does not increase
the costs to the opposing party." 6 Courts applying the objective standard,
however, require a practitioner to refrain from any conduct that may cause
needless delays. 87 Because the attorney's intent is irrelevant under the
179. See supra note 5 (noting that in enacting 1980 amendment to § 1927, Congress
intended to deter delays in litigation process).
180. See McKirdy, supra note 176, at 709 (noting that because of difficulties in determining
subjective intent of attorney who causes delays, bad faith requirement would not affect
litigation delays).
181. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1270-71 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting both that
plaintiff had no basis for suit and that attorney continued prosecution of meritless action),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1373 (1987).
182. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (noting that Oliveri court applied bad
faith standard to § 1927 and reversed sanctions against attorney).
183. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting that Oliveri court held that attorney
did not meet bad faith standard). The plaintiff's attorney in Oliveri would have met the
objective standard because the attorney pursued a frivolous claim. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d
977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that attorney meets objective standard when attorney pursues
frivolous claims).
184. See supra note 156-57 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts' use of bad
faith standard would add nothing to courts' powers to sanction other than to codify courts'
inherent power to sanction attorneys who litigate in bad faith).
185. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (comparing standards used by federal courts
to determine whether to sanction attorney under § 1927).
186. See supra notes 54-80 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application bad
faith standard in sanctioning attorney under § 1927).
187. See supra notes 81-106 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application of
objective standard in sanctioning attorney under § 1927).
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objective standard, the court only must find that the attorney delayed the
litigation before sanctioning the attorney under section 1927.188 Attorneys
must promote clients' interests in litigation without ignoring the necessary
goals of judicial efficiency and effectiveness. 189 Because Congress intended
to discourage delay and, consequently, to provide a more efficient and
effective court system, the objective standard clearly serves these goals more
effectively.
KEv N J. HENDERSON
188. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (noting that under objective standard,
attorney's intent to multiply litigation proceedings is not relevant to court determining whether
to sanction attorney under § 1927).
189. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (noting court's reasoning that attorney
owes duty to courts as well as to client, and court should sanction attorney who falls short
of duty to courts).
